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INTRODUCTION
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is an amorphous geopolitical concept,
employed mostly as a collective name for the broadly conceived former
Soviet bloc in Europe, and frequently extending into Albania, the former
Yugoslavia, and Romania. Accordingly, neither Finland nor Greece is
typically mentioned as CEE countries, although they geographically both
lie east of the Czech Republic and Slovenia.' The purpose of this paper is
to discuss whether there are any existing idiosyncratic considerations
* Wojciech Sadowski is a partner based in Warsaw in the K&L Gates LLP
international arbitration team. This article is based on the personal opinion of the author
and does not necessarily reflect the views of the law firm with which he is associated or
of any of the clients of that firm.
1. There are different approaches to defining CEE. See Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEES), OECD (Nov. 2, 2001) ("Central and Eastern European
Countries (CEECs) is an OECD term for the group of countries comprising Albania,
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, and the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania", leaving
Ukraine or Serbia outside), https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=303 (last
visited June 7, 2016); cf Central & Eastern Europe, FIN.TIMES (including Russia
and Austria as well), http://www.ft.con-1intl/reports/central-eastern-europe (last visited
June 7, 2016); cf 2013 Statistical Report, 25 ICC INT'L CT. OF ARB, BULL. (including
Turkey and Greece).
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
involving CEE which could help explain the current condition of
international arbitration in the region. With this understanding of CEE, I
will make informed predictions concerning the possible trends in dispute
resolution in the future.
The central conclusion I will make in this paper is that the cycle of
development of international commercial arbitration in CEE may be
approaching a low mark. The forces that were driving the development of
international arbitration in this part of the world before 1989, such as the
East-West dichotomy and the subsequent increased commercial, legal, and
political risk connected to the "emerging-economy" status of CEE
countries, exhausted most of its potential, which is unlikely to rebound. At
the present moment, there are no compelling reasons why international
arbitration in CEE should flourish. It is clear, however, that its future
development will have to respond to the changing needs and preferences of
the business community and the individual CEE states, rather than the
objectives immediately relied upon after the fall of Communism.
This paper starts with a brief historical note explaining the traditional
motivations leading commercial parties to agree on international arbitration
in the CEE-related business context, both before and after the fall of
Communism in 1989. I will present the developments of the past twenty-
five years that help explain the current position and potential of
international commercial arbitration in CEE. Due to the significant
diversity among the countries in the region, I will not offer a detailed
analysis of the particular legal frameworks in each individual CEE state.
The differences between various national laws within the region do not
play a primary role. Instead, I will emphasize the existing and potential
interests and reasons that may convince the business community across
CEE to use international arbitration to resolve commercial disputes. These
enticing factors do not depend as much on the legal particularities of
individual CEE jurisdictions as on the broader economic and cultural
considerations of the region generally.
II. HISTORY
A. Cold War
The genesis of the current condition of international commercial
arbitration in CEE goes back to the Cold War, when Europe was divided
into two opposite camps founded on conflicting ideologies.2  Western
2. Obviously, arbitration in Central and Eastern Europe existed for centuries, and
most countries in the region had arbitration laws operating both before the Second
World War and in the Cold-War era. See, e.g., Matthew Hodgson, The Rebirth of
Arbitration in Central and Eastern Europe, 6 GLOBAL ARB. REv. (July 4, 2011). Those
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Europe developed on the premise of the free market ideology, supported by
democratic values and the rule of law. Eastern Europe struggled to
implement the "socialist utopia" of centrally planned economies and
authoritarian regimes that were imposed and maintained by the Soviet
Union's political and military hegemony in the region. In such a hostile
environment, international commercial arbitration had clear advantages as a
method of dispute resolution between the East and the West. The main
rationale for selecting international arbitration was the ideological
polarization of the respective political, economic, and military camps,
which led to mutual distrust. Western companies had no confidence in the
Eastern European legal and court systems, which-apart from political or
ideological issues-were also ill-equipped to deal with issues of
international trade, contractual freedom, or complex commercial relations.
Most of the industry in Eastern Europe was nationalized after the Second
World War. State-owned enterprises, which had little inclination to
surrender to the jurisdiction of Western European state courts, contributed
to the bulk of economic activity. From that perspective, East-West
arbitrations in Communist times were prevailingly mixed arbitrations-
disputes between states and state-owned entities from the East, and private
entities from the West.
3
International arbitration naturally arrived on the scene as an attractive
option for resolving commercial disputes, primarily because it allowed for
a certain degree of neutrality. Not accidentally, Austria (initially various
regional courts, followed by the creation of the Vienna International
Arbitral Centre),4 Sweden (Arbitration Institute at the Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce)5, and, to a lesser extent, Switzerland, were the most
frequently used fora for arbitrating the East-West disputes at that time.
6
historic considerations, however important to the sense of continuity of arbitration
culture, do not seem, however, to be highly relevant business or legal factors affecting
the possible future development of arbitration in this part of the world. For this reason,
they will not be further discussed in this paper.
3. See Kazimierz Grzybowski, Arbitral Tribunals for Foreign Trade in Socialist
Countries, Law and Contemporary Problems 597 et seq. (vol. 37, 1972); see Thomas
E. Carbonneau, Law and Practice of Arbitration 626 (5th ed. 2014); Andrzej W.
Wigniewski, Migdzynarodowy arbitraz handlowy w Polsce (1 st ed. 2011).
4. See Werner Melis, The Formation of the VIA C, 1 VIAC - SELECTED ARBITRAL
AWARDS, 16-17 (Austria), http://www.viac.eu/images/documents/05_Einleitungen.pd
f; Gary B. Born, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS:
DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 54 (4th ed. 2013).
5. With respect to Stockholm, reference is usually made to an agreement between
the American Arbitration Association and the USSR Chamber of Commerce and
Industry to regard the SCC as the neutral place for resolution of US-USRR commercial
disputes. See About Arbitration in Sweden, Swiss ARB. ASS'N,
http://swedisharbitration.se/about-arbitration-in-sweden/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
6. In particular with respect to contracts made with Yugoslavian entities, see
2016
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This is due in large part to the fact that these three states were not aligned
with the East or the West. Indeed, none have ever become NATO
members.7 Austria and Sweden joined the European Union only in 1995,
shortly after the fall of Communism in Europe.
It would be inaccurate, however, to associate commercial arbitration
behind the Soviet bloc with exclusively East-West interactions.
Communist legislatures envisaged arbitration to be useful for domestic
commercial arbitration as well as within the CMEA (Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance), pursuant to the 1972 Moscow Convention. This led
to the creation of a number of arbitration institutes within CEE in the 1950s
and 1960s, most of which have continued to operate to this present day.
However, the experience those institutions gained before 1989 has held
only limited relevance in the new political, economic, and legal reality of
the post-1989 era. Accordingly, many of those institutions had to undergo
deep transformations in order to re-adapt to their new legislative and
economic models. As it will be shown, most CEE arbitration cases are
today still managed by these institutions.
B. Transformation (1989-2015)
After the fall of Communism in 1989-1990 and the announcement by
the former members of the Soviet Bloc of their intention to transform into
market economies, CEE became one of the most attractive locations in the
world for investment. Beginning in the 1990s, both international
companies and international law firms began to establish offices in the
major cities of the region, including Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw. The
economic transformation and the influx of foreign direct investment have
brought a radical transformation to region's economic, legal, and political
landscape since the fall of the Communism. It would be far beyond the
limits of this paper to provide a comprehensive analysis of this
unprecedented phenomenon, even if limited solely to the evolution of
international arbitration. For this reason, the following analysis is, by
necessity, simplified and selective.
In any event, the most important feature of the post-1989 period in CEE
is the increasing lack of homogeneity between the paths that the various
CEE states adopted and pursued, resulting in stark differences between
their current political and economic conditions.8 The CEE region includes,
on the one end of the transformation spectrum, Slovenia-a small, well-
Michael Wietzorek, Arbitration in Serbia, in Austrian Arbitration Yearbook 2009 357,
360 (Gerelad Zeiler et al. eds., 2009).
7. NA TO Member Countries, N. ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natolive/nato countries.htm.
8. Wietzorek, supra note 6, at 358.
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developed economy that is closely integrated with Northern Italy and
Southern Austria, a member of NATO and the European Union,
maintaining a per capita GDP of $24,002 (USD) (2014).' On the other end
of the spectrum is Belarus-an authoritarian regime, closely integrated
with Russia, with a per capita GDP of $8,040, and the only European state
that has not become a party to the European Convention of Human Rights.
Other countries from the CEE region are placed between these two
extremes.
The second critical issue is the scale of the development that has
occurred in CEE since 1990 and how CEE states now compare against
other world economies. For example, the gross domestic product of Poland
in 1990 was $64.7 billion, while the GDP of Norway in the same year was
nearly $120 billion.' 0 By 2014, however, Poland's GDP reached ca. $545
billion and has surpassed Norway's current GDP of $500 billion."
However, the GDP per capita in Poland in 2014 was still only $14,337,
compared to e.g. $47,774 in Germany.12 This basic economic analysis is
essential for two reasons. First, it proves that CEE-based clients are on
average less affluent and hence will be more sensitive to the costs of
international arbitration than their Western European counterparts. Second,
the scale of economic development of CEE countries should be kept in
mind when assessing the growth of related arbitration disputes over the last
twenty-five years. Nevertheless, such analysis should not solely be made
by reference to absolute figures. The analysis should be considered in
proportion to the overall economic development of the region. As I will
discuss below, even though the number of CEE arbitrations continues to
grow, this growth is disproportionately low in relation to regional economic
growth. This suggests that international arbitration remains underused in
CEE.
The undisputed economic growth of the region is inexorably linked to
the transformation and development of political and legal systems, both
domestic and international. Domestically, CEE states combined the
growing sophistication of lawmakers, regulators, and courts with increasing
effectiveness of law enforcement and respect for the rule of law.
Internationally, the accession of most CEE states to the Council of Europe
and the European Convention of Human Rights-and submission to the
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights-prompted a giant
9. GDP Per Capita (Current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indi
cator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (last visited June 8, 2016).
10. GDP at Market Prices (Current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.or
g/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries?page=5 (last visited June 8, 2016).
11. Id.
12. GDP Per Capita (Current US$), supra note 9.
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leap in the region's development. The integration process of most CEE
countries into the European Union (EU) in three subsequent enlargements
of the EU in 2004,"3 2007,14 and 201315 was another great step forward,
which has led to the contraction of the legal, economic, and civilizational
gap between Western and Eastern Europe.
The radical developmental changes that took place in CEE had a tangible
impact on the use of international commercial arbitration. Trends in CEE-
related international arbitration panels during the past twenty-five years
have been dynamic. In the years immediately following 1989, arbitration
was still the preferred dispute resolution method for Western (particularly
U.S.-based) corporations and individuals doing business in CEE.
However, unlike in the pre-1989 era, when external forces limited the
choice of dispute resolution due to the need for neutrality, after 1990
arbitration was preferred by the Western parties in their business contracts
with CEE parties because of the weakness of the CEE state organizations.
Accordingly, the underdevelopment of the legal and judicial systems of
CEE states, their vulnerability to various types of fraud and abuse, and the
perceived or actual risk of corruption that mandated the transfer of CEE-
related dispute resolution before international arbitral tribunals. In short,
the position of international business in the first years after 1989 was
conducive to arbitration with CEE parties. However, such arbitrations
were frequently seated outside CEE, in countries, which were known for
their pro-arbitration approach.16 Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in
CEE was then perceived as a risk, especially due to the frequent
discretionary use of the public policy exception by state courts. However,
most CEE countries were parties to the New York Convention17 and,
eventually, successfully enforcing foreign arbitral award became more
13. EU Member Countries, EUROPA EU (April 11, 2015), http://europa.eu/about-
eu/countries/member-countries/ (adding Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia).
14. Id. (adding Bulgaria and Romania).
15. Id. (adding Croatia).
16. Wietzorek, supra note 6, at 360.
17. See Status Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), U. NATIONS COMMISSION ON INT'L TRADE L.
(noting that the NYC entered into force with respect to the following states: Albania
(25 September 2001), Belarus (13 February 1961), Bulgaria (8 January 1962), Czech
Republic (1 January 1993), Croatia (8 October 1991), Estonia (28 November 1993),
Hungary (3 June 1962), Latvia (13 July 1992), Lithuania (12 June 1995), Poland (1
January 1962), Romania (12 December 1961), Russia (22 November 1960), Moldova
(17 December 1998), Serbia (27 April 1992), Slovakia (1 January 1993), Slovenia (25
June 1991), Macedonia (17 November 1991), Ukraine (8 January 1961)),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention-status.htm
I (last visited on Apr. 8, 2016).
Vol. 5:3
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
predictable in most states in the CEE region.'8
In the post-1989 era, Stockholm and Vienna remained, for historic
reasons, important arbitral institutions for CEE. Both private-public deals
included arbitration clauses, such as privatization agreements, as well as
joint-venture agreements with CEE-based companies and individuals.
Disputes emerged in both types of transactions and exposed the CEE-based
private companies to their first practical experiences with international
arbitration. This in an important point because the state ownership of
parties to the pre-1989 East-West arbitrations meant that on the Eastern
side, chiefly state and state-owned entities were involved. Thus, due to the
overall scarcity of exchangeable currency, the principal problem was the
availability of funds and not the risk-benefit analysis of arbitration versus
other forms of dispute resolution management. Therefore, following the
transformation of 1998, there was not only very little institutionalized
knowledge of arbitration among CEE states, but also the available
knowledge was much dispersed and partially inadequate.
As time progressed, the situation began to change. Foreign entities grew
accustomed to doing business in CEE and the perceived commercial risk
began to wane. On the other hand, arbitration standards in the region were
constantly increasing. As a part of wider process of legislative reforms, all
CEE states have amended their respective arbitration laws. In general, the
present national arbitration laws in the region reflect the provisions of the
UNCITRAL Model Law, albeit some important distinctions among the
arbitration laws of various countries. Stockholm and Vienna gradually
began to lose ground to other centres of international arbitration. By 2009,
the ICC was already the most frequently chosen arbitral institution.
However, the Russian and Ukrainian companies would also often choose
arbitration in accordance with the LCIA arbitration rules.' 
9
The arbitration disputes that ensued, involving multiple parties from the
region, help explain the dynamics of this dispute resolution method to the
CEE business and legal community. The conclusions drawn from those
cases were not always encouraging. A relevant example is the Elektrim
case, which took place in Poland and became notorious because of the
problem of possible extra-territorial application of Polish bankruptcy laws
and its impact on foreign-seated international arbitration proceedings
18. See generally Illeanu M. Smeureanu, Five Facts About Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Awards in Central and Eastern Europe, KLUWER ARB. BLOG
(June 26, 2014), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/06/26/five-facts-about-
recognition-and-enforcement-of-foreign-awards-in-central-and-eastern-europe/.
19. The fact is well-known across international arbitration community in Europe.
See Dmitry Davydenko, Every Third LCIA Case Involves a CIS-related Party, CIS
ARB. FORUM (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.cisarbitration.com/2015/11/03/each-third-
Icia-case-involves-a-cis-related-party/, for written sources.
2016
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LA W REVIEW
involving a bankrupt party.20 The point here, however, is that apart from
revealing idiosyncrasies of the Polish legal system, the dispute itself was
essentially a ten-year battle over control of a leading Polish mobile
communications company. The dispute produced staggering legal
representation costs and, for some time, kept the company in a conundrum
that prevented it from fully exploiting its business potential. Another
Polish example is the case of PZU, the biggest Polish insurance company
and CEE's largest financial institution, which from 2001 to 2010 was
hostage to a shareholders' dispute known as the Eureko case.21  The
commercial wisdom gained from such cases in the region was that
international arbitration comes at a high price and does not always lead to
commercially satisfactory results.
In parallel to the big-ticket arbitrations common in London, Paris,
Geneva, Zurich, Vienna, and Stockholm, thousands of CEE commercial
cases in both the domestic and international context were referred to state
courts and domestic arbitration institutes. This trend had a colossal impact
on the development of the legal systems in CEE, as it helped to build a
body of case law that ultimately improved legal predictability and filling
some of the existing lacunae. It also helped to shape and reinforce the
arbitral practice at the national level in CEE. In terms of volume, leading
national arbitral institutions in CEE countries have had much larger inflow
of cases than most of the recognized international centres, such as the
LCIA, VIAC, and SCC. For example, in 2014 the VIAC registered only
fifty-six cases, whereas, in Poland alone, each of the two arbitral courts
(Lewiatan and the Court of Arbitration at the Polish Chamber of
22Commerce) have a larger yearly intake of cases. Most of these disputes,
20. Deyan Draguiev, The Effect of Insolvency on Pending International
Arbitration: What Is and What Should Not Be, 32 J. INT'L ARIB., 511, 537 (2015); see
Elektrim SA v. Vivendi Universal SA, [2007] EWHC (QB) 571 (Eng.) reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 800-10 (Gary Born, 2d ed.
2015). See generally Elizabeth Williamson, Deutsche Telecom Strives for Key Role In
Poland Stake in Elektrim Units, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2000, 12:00 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articies/SB977173664332936144; Deutsche Telekom Enters into
an Agreement o Securc Undisputed Ownership ovcr Polish Mobile Operator PTC,
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM (Dec. 15, 2010), https://www.telekom.com/media/company/6912
4.
21. See Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award (Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment Trib. 2005), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/fil
es/case-documents/itaO308 0.pdf The ten-year dispute inclusively served as a case
study for Harvard Business School, see Francesca Gina ET AL., Poles Apart on PZU
(A), in HBA CASE COLLECTION 912-013 (2012, revised 2014).
22. In Poland, for example, the Court of Arbitration at the Polish Chamber of
Commerce resolved approximately 350 disputes in 2013, with an aggregate value of
PLN I billion (EUR 200 million). According to the President of the Court of
Arbitration, the inflow of cases to the Court is rather stable and varies between 300 and
400 annually, PULS BIZNESU (last visited June 8, 2016), http://www.pb.pl/3650342,955
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however, are either small or very small in size.
Another essential point that should be taken into consideration in the
context of CEE-related international arbitration is the frequent appearance
of states and state agencies as parties to disputes. This phenomenon is
driven by three major categories of matters: privatization disputes,
investment treaty disputes, and infrastructure disputes. While privatization
disputes are now largely considered a historic category, both investment
treaty and infrastructure disputes continue to play a central role in the
development of international arbitration in CEE.
Between 1987 and 2000, CEE countries concluded hundreds of bilateral
investment treaties, in particular with more developed Western
economies.23 The relevance of bilateral treaty arbitrations in this context is
due to the fact that most of the significant arbitration disputes involving
CEE in the last twenty-five years were either petitioned on the basis of
bilateral investment treaties or developed into bilateral investment treaty
disputes. Although ICSID adjudicated most of these disputes, the inclusion
of the SCC in the arbitration provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty and
some other bilateral investment treaties allowed Stockholm to remain one
of the most significant venues for resolution of investment treaty disputes.
The emergence of infrastructure disputes is due primarily to CEE states'
vast needs for all sorts of infrastructure: roads, highways, railways, airport,
and seaport facilities. From around the year 2000, both the European
Commission and most multilateral development banks that provide funds
for large infrastructure projects began to promote FIDIC conditions for
construction contracts as the model imposed on developing states, in
particular in CEE. This led to the inclusion of an ICC arbitration clause
(the default dispute resolution clause) in many infrastructure-related FIDIC
construction contracts, usually with the participation of states, state
agencies, or municipalities as employers. As a consequence, a number of
arbitration proceedings ensued, which sometimes left the state parties
defeated.
CEE and other states' involvement in international arbitrations have
gradually led some of those states to adopt a less favourable approach to
95,sad-arbitrazowy-przy-kig-rozpatrzyl-ok-350-spraw-wartych- 1 mld-zl-w-2013-
r.; there were 280 cases registered by that Court in 2014, including 35 international
cases. The Lewiatan Court of Arbitration registered 56 new cases in 2013 and 58 new
cases in 2014, Dzialalno96 S4duw 2014 roku [Proceedings in 2014], LEWIATAN,
http://www.sadarbitrazowy.org.pl/pl/podstrony/dzialalnosc-sadu-w-2014-roku.html
(last visited June 8, 2016).
23. In particular, the Czech Republic currently has 79 bilateral investment treaties,
Slovakia- 54, Romania - 82, Bulgaria- 67, Poland - 61; Ukraine - 73, Lithuania-
54; Latvia - 44, Estonia - 27. International Investments Agreements Navigator, INV.
POL'Y HUB (last visited Apr. 1, 2016), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA.
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arbitration as a matter of policy. For example, the Polish state agency
responsible for construction of highways and motorways decided to amend
the standard FIDIC contract terms following a few arbitration disputes with
foreign contractors in way so as to replace ICC arbitration with exclusive
jurisdiction of the Polish state courts. From that state agency's perspective,
this was not an unreasonable step, because the Polish rules of litigation
before state courts are crafted in such way that it is very hard for
contractors to establish their case. Accordingly, the statistics of road
construction disputes before state courts are usually very favourable to
public employers. In Hungary, Article 4 of the Arbitration Act provides
that disputes where the subject matter qualifies as a national asset (within
the meaning of the Act CXCVI of 2011 on National Assets) within the
boundaries of Hungary including the rights, claims, and privileges related
to such asset are not arbitrable. This essentially excludes all state property
from arbitration. Romania, following the Micula24 award and the response
adopted by the European Commission against the enforcement of the
award, has found itself between Scylla and Charibdis. This may lead
Romanian authorities to take a more cautious approach to arbitration in the
future.
III. PRESENT SITUATION
The current situation of international commercial arbitration in CEE is
undoubtedly impacted by the overall economic and political crisis affecting
Europe, as well as the relative stability of the region. CEE is no longer the
most promising world market, nor is it such a risky place where
international arbitration should be considered as the only reasonable
dispute resolution method. The historic reasons why disputes involving
CEE states were referred to neutral arbitration fora are no longer relevant.
This change of paradigm is well reflected in the transformation that has
happened in recent years by the two international arbitration centres that
were traditionally associated with the resolution of East-West disputes; the
SCC and the VIAC. The SCC managed to readjust to the changing posture
of international arbitration by opening itself to investment arbitrations
under the Energy Charter Treaty and commercial disputes involving
Ukraine, Russian Federation, and China. In contrast, the VIAC has failed
to find its own niche, and instead purported to capitalize on the historic
position of Vienna as the former capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
and a cultural regional centre for Southern Poland, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia. However, these efforts have had
24. loan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and
S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award (Dec. 11,
2013).
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limited success and the VIAC has gradually decayed to the position of a
reputable national arbitration institution with limited international
significance .
In 2011, M. Hodgson reported that international arbitration was
26flourishing in CEE. However, that growth appears to have slowed since
2011. The plain truth is that for many reasons, international arbitration is
no longer as attractive in this part of the world as it was in the years
immediately following the Cold War. For example, the potential to rely on
the New York Convention in order to enforce both the arbitration
agreement and the arbitral award in most states is regarded as the most
important advantage of international commercial arbitration.27 Without a
doubt, the New York Convention has been one of the most significant
successes in the treaty-making practice of the United Nations. There is no
similar global instrument to enforce court decisions. Within the European
Union, however, the benefits of the New York Convention are dwarfed by
the now much stronger and robust system of judicial cooperation in civil
and commercial matters in the European Union. Since the European
Commission launched a law-making offensive in this arena, starting in
December 2000 with the enactment of the Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels I
Regulation), EU member states now benefit from a number of regulations
that have to be applied directly in a uniform manner across Europe.
The key advantage of the presently binding Brussels I Regulation on
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
(Regulation 1215/12)28 over the New York Convention is that judicial
decisions, which are issued and enforceable in a Member State of the
European Union, are automatically enforceable in all other Member States
of the European Union without requiring any declaration of
enforceability.29 A Member State can only refuse to enforce a judgment
25. It is remarkable that the 2015 QMJL Arbitration Survey does not even
mention Vienna as a preferred forum for international arbitration, 2015 International
Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration, WHITE
& CASE (2015), http://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publica
tions/qmul-international-arbitration-survey-2015_0.pdf
26. Hodgson, supra note 2.
27. See 2015 International Arbitration Survey, supra note 25 (mentioning
enforceability as the most important perceived advantage of international arbitration
among users).
28. Council Regulation 1215/2012 of December 12, 2012, On Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2012
O.J. (L 351) 1 (EU) (known as Brussels I Regulation 'recast') (replacing Council
Regulation No 44/2001 of the European Parliament of December 22, 2000, On
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters).
29. Council Regulation 1215/15, art. 39, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1.
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upon an application of the interested party and only on the basis of a few
narrowly crafted grounds that are subject to interpretation of the Court of
Justice of the European Union. Therefore, even though Regulation 1215/
12 provides for a theoretical possibility to refuse enforcement on public
policy grounds, the practical scope of application of this exception is very
narrow.30 The territorial application of the Brussels I Regulations is further
extended by virtue of the Lugano Convention31 onto certain non-EU
countries, such as Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway. As a result, almost
all of Europe is covered by highly efficient tools to enforce international
judgments. At present, that territorial scope covers most of the geographic
reach of CEE business entities.
Furthermore, while Regulation 1215/12 provides for a generally
applicable framework in civil and commercial matters in the European
Union, other instruments provide alternative possible advantages to
litigants. Regulation 805/2004 introduced the European Enforcement
Order for uncontested claims in order to facilitate cross-border
enforcement in situations where defendants do not oppose the claims but
merely refuse to pay.32 Regulation 1896/2006 introduced the European
Payment Order Procedure,33 which is a standardized procedure ideally
suited for vindication of outstanding liabilities. Regulation 861/2007 was
designed to deal with small claims,34 which is also very important for small
and medium enterprises. Those regulations are supported with secondary
Regulations on taking of evidence, service of documents, and European
Account Preservation Order.
As a result of the foregoing, companies operating in CEE have a strong
30. See, e.g., Case C-681/13, Diageo Brands BV v. Simiramida-04 EOOD, 2015
E.C.R. 1-350 ("In accordance with the Court's settled case-law, while the Member
States in principle remain free, by virtue of the proviso in Article 34(1) of Regulation
No 44/2001, to determine, according to their own national conceptions, what the
requirements of their public policy are, the limits of that concept are a matter of
interpretation of that regulation. Consequently, while it is not for the Court to define
the content of the public policy of a Member State, it is none the less required to review
the limits within which the courts of a Member State may have recourse to that concept
for the purpose of refusing recognition of a judgment emanating from a court in
another Member State (see judgment in flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines, C-302/13,
EU:C:2014.2319, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).").
31. Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 2007 [hereinafter Lugano
Convention].
32. Council Regulation 805/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 15 (creating a European
Enforcement Order for uncontested claims).
33. Council Regulation 1896/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 399) 1 (creating a European order
for payment procedure).
34. Council Regulation 861/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 399) 1 (establishing a European
Small Claims Procedure).
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reason to reconsider using arbitration as the preferred route of resolution
for cross-border disputes. Statistically, in the vast majority of cases, intra-
EU court litigation could be an attractive alternative to these companies,
especially in terms of cost effectiveness and the speed of the proceedings.
Could non-CEE parties seriously consider litigation in CEE as a
reasonable option? It is beyond contention that CEE state courts cannot be
compared with some of the most reputable Western European courts, such
as the London courts. However, measured against courts in other parts of
the European Union, such as Spain, Belgium, or Greece, the outcome of the
comparison is not readily obvious. For many years, observers viewed
corruption as the largest problem with the CEE judiciary. To an extent,
corruption continues to be a major challenge in some CEE states and it
concerns both national courts and arbitral institutions.35 However, this
notion is not necessarily true in the broad-brush sense. For example,
Estonia is ranked twenty-sixth in the Transparency International 2014
Corruption Perceptions Index, ex aequo with France, and ahead of Spain,
Portugal, Italy, and Greece. Other CEE countries, such as Lithuania,
Poland, and Slovenia also received relatively high marks.
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Secondly, most of the CEE region has been a part of the European Union
since 2004. The legal regimes within individual EU member states are
required to have some degree of uniformity and the degree to which the EU
integration process has managed to harmonize large parts of business law
across Europe should not be underestimated. Vast areas of CEE were
dominated until 1918 by either the German Empire or the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. Hence, the core of the private law systems in the CEE
countries is strongly influenced by the great Austro-German codifications
of the 19th and 20th centuries. For these reasons, there are clearly
demarcated division lines within the region, most noticeably between those
states that joined the EU in 2004 and those that have not yet joined the EU,
such as Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, Kosovo, and Macedonia.
The foregoing provides evidence that, with respect to the CEE states that
are members of the EU, there are strong arguments in favour of using
harmonized tools of cross-border litigation in civil and commercial matters
35. N. Eastwell, J. Logesova, ET AL., GUERRILLA TACTICS AND HoW-TO-COUNTER
THEM IN NATIONAL LITIGATION: [H] EXCURSUS: COMPLIANCE AND CORRUPTION IN THE
CEE/SEE AND TURKEY, IN GUERRILLA TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 229
(S. Wilske & G.J. Horvath eds., 2013); Stephen Wilske, Lars Markert, & Laura
Br~iuninger, Chapter IV: Investment Arbitration, Pertinent Issues in Investment
Arbitration against Romania: A Case Study in Challenges and Pitfalls of Investment
Disputes in Central and Eastern Europe, in AUSTRIAN ARBITRATION YEARBOOK 2015
476, 493 (Christian Klausegger et al., eds. 2015).
36. 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (Apr. 3, 2016, 4:38
PM), http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results.
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over resorting to arbitration. This may be one of the reasons why
arbitration seems to be still underused in CEE. In this respect, the current
state of play is reflected in the recent statistics of the arbitral institutions
traditionally selected to resolve CEE commercial disputes, such as the
VIAC, SCC, LCIA, and ICC. Apart from the ICC, none of these
institutions appear to expand their CEE-related dockets.
In the VIAC, the annual intake of new cases fell from seventy-five in
2011 to fifty-six in 2014 (with seventy new cases in 2012 and fifty-six
new cases in 2013). This appears to be a long-term trend. CEE states
rarely include dispute resolution clauses providing for arbitration under the
VIAC. Local Austrian and German companies are now the principal users
of the VIAC. Of the seventy newly registered cases in 2012, forty-eight
parties were Austrian, while twenty-nine parties were German. The third-
most frequent party nationality was Romanians with nine cases. Overall,
the CEE states, Cyprus, Malta, and the Russian Federation were parties to
fifty-seven cases registered by the VIAC. In 2014, parties from these same
states were parties in only thirty-four cases before the VIAC. This could
be construed as proof that CEE cases occupy an important share of the
VIAC docket. However, fifty-six cases per year is not an impressive result
per se and it is certainly not commensurate to the growth of economic
exchange by the CEE parties between 1990 and 2015.
The yearly intake of new cases in the SCC is more significant. Domestic
Swedish cases constitute around 50-60% of the volume. With respect to
international cases (that are defined as cases in which at least one party is
non-Swedish), the volume has remained at a relatively constant level since
2008, varying from seventy-five to eighty-five new cases per year. The
principal non-Swedish users of the SCC have been a relatively stable group
of states, including Russia, Germany, China, the UK and the US, Denmark,
Norway, and Finland. CEE companies appear before the SCC much less
than the aforementioned states. In eithy-three international cases
registered by the SCC in 2013, only eight parties were from the Baltic
states, two from Ukraine, and one from Belarus, Czech Republic, Poland
and Romania each. These are not impressive figures by any standards.
The LCIA Registrar report for 2013 indicated that 290 arbitration cases
were initiated in that year. In terms of the percentage of users from CEE,
Russian entities appeared in 3.4% cases, whereas other CEE parties totalled
3.6%. The combined 7% was lower than the use of LCIA arbitration by
US or BVI entities (7.1% each). In 2012, the figures were similar with
Russian cases making up 3.25% of the LCIA docket, and CEE cases
amounting to an aggregate of 4%. Admittedly, some Eastern European
cases may be hidden among cases with Cypriot involvement (3.8 to 4.5%
cases). Nevertheless, the volume in which CEE entities use LCIA is very
low. The 7.1% of 290 is roughly equal to twenty cases.
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The ICC Court of Arbitration is the unquestionable leader among
international institutions dealing with CEE arbitration. According to ICC
statistics, 275 CEE parties were involved in cases in 2014. Even without
Greece and Turkey in this category (totalling ninety parties), the remaining
countries from CEE would amount to 185 parties. Among those, Bulgaria,
Russia, Romania, Cyprus, and Hungary are the most frequent users.
37
These figures show that the ICC Court of Arbitration is the most popular
arbitral institution. The preference for ICC arbitration likely results from
the juxtaposition of various considerations, such as promotion of the ICC
Court of Arbitration in the FIDIC contract conditions. Additionally, the
structure of the Court of Arbitration is a factor, which includes the role of
its National Committees and the interactive approach of the Secretariat in
developing good working relations with arbitration practitioner
communities in the CEE countries. Still, the CEE parties' (including
Turkey and Greece) case volume in the ICC Court of Arbitration
corresponds to only 40% of the cases from Northern and Western Europe
(30% cases excluding Turkey and Greece). Remarkably, the percentage of
states and parastatal parties in all cases from CEE (7.6%) was significantly
higher than the same ratio with respect to Northern and Western Europe
(0.4%).
What seems to be important, however, is that these reputable arbitral
institutions serve only a share of all arbitration cases resolved in CEE. As
noted above, many disputes in both a purely domestic and mixed (domestic
versus foreign party) context are referred to the national arbitral centres that
exist in most CEE states. Some of them have international ambitions,
including the Court of Arbitration at the Polish Chamber of Commerce, the
Arbitration Court attached to the Economic Chamber of the Czech
Republic and the Agricultural Chamber of the Czech Republic, Court of
Arbitration at the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry or the
Court of International Commercial Arbitration attached to the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry of Romania in Bucharest.38 However, none of
these national arbitral institutions has managed to rise to the level of an
arbitral centre for its surrounding region. This could be due to various
possible reasons, three of which I shall present here.
First, no CEE state has focused on making an international arbitration an
institution of commercial and political strategy. Development of an arbitral
37. 2014 ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics, ICC Disp. RESOL. BULL. 2015/No. 1,
p. 6.
38. See Grigore Florescu & Christina Florescu, Part I: International Commercial
Arbitration, Chapter 5. The Latest Developments in Commercial Arbitration in
Romania, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW:
SYNERGY, CONVERGENCE AND EVOLUTION 95, 109 (S. K6ll ET. AL, eds., 2011).
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institution clearly involves a combination of factors, ranging from an
adequate hearing centre, appropriate marketing and funding, organization
of a quality, and pro-arbitration approach of the legislatures and courts. So
far, no CEE state has managed to offer this to the international community.
Second, the newly created legal systems of the CEE states have been
overtly or covertly suspicious of arbitration. In part, this is the result of the
initial weaknesses of the state institutions, which were abused and
exploited in many unethical ways, especially at the beginning of their
transformation process. Back then, CEE-seated arbitration was not a
synonym for professional ethics and integrity, but secretive private courts
which could rule in contempt of the law to support murky business
interests. This was the reason, for example, why Polish bankruptcy law of
2003 provided that initiating bankruptcy proceedings terminates ex lege all
arbitration clauses of the bankrupt party and discontinues all pending
arbitration proceedings. Latvia is the most recent example of this problem.
There, a new arbitration law entered into force on January 1, 2015, aiming
to radically reduce the number of arbitration courts. The problem the law
attempted to address was the reality in which more than 120 arbitration
courts operated in a country populated by approximately two million
people. Most of those courts were shabby, non-transparent organisations
that rendered services of dubious quality and dissuaded businesses from
using arbitration.
Third, horizontal ties between various CEE states are very weak and
insufficient. Most CEE states would rather look to Western European
countries or to the United States to engage in international relations than
purport to engage in an exchange or initiative with their neighbouring
states. To a large extent, these problems are due to historical reasons,
including past dominance of certain countries in the region over the
territories of others. In these surroundings, there is no obvious candidate
for leadership, even as a regional centre of international arbitration.
However, there may be no need for such a centre in the first place. It is
likely that national arbitral institutions will continue to resolve most CEE-
related disputes at a domestic level, and refer other cases to the existing
reputable institutions, such as the ICC. For the present time, such scenario
has two important advantages for the users. First, local arbitration is often
less expensive than international arbitrations before the most recognized
institutions. T his responds to the critical feature of the CEE-based
businesses, which is cost-sensitivity. Domestic arbitration also tends to be
quicker, and in the majority of cases, the quality provided is
commeasurable to the value and complexity of the case. Second, the legal
and language differences between various CEE states also play an
important role in individual cases, and circulation of arbitrators and lawyers
among various CEE jurisdictions is seriously hindered.
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IV. PERSPECTIVES
The problem with international arbitration in CEE is that its past growth
occurred in response to some important deficit-whether that was
ideological neutrality, corruption, or lack of adequate rule of law. Even
recently, increases in the number of arbitration cases from certain countries
in CEE were caused by grave problems of the judicial systems in those
countries. However, barring these types of emergency situations that are
unlikely to persist, what edge does international arbitration over other
forms of dispute resolution?
As I have demonstrated, enforcing arbitral awards is no longer its clear
advantage, at least in the EU context. Time and money seem tugging at the
hearts of commercial actors in today's economy. However, both CEE-
based arbitration under the rules of some local arbitral institution and
domestic court proceedings are likely to provide the party with a cheaper,
and possibly faster decision, sometimes granted ex parte. These
considerations are of paramount practical importance. Although CEE-
based businesses have much more limited resources than Western
European businesses, they have to compete both in the European Union
and beyond. Hence, they put strong emphasis on cost-cutting and dispute
management, which has often evolved from dispute resolution to dispute
aversion. At the beginning of the transformation process, a number of
international law firms opened their offices in CEE. These firm's
applicable hourly rates at that time were exorbitant compared to the local
fee arrangements that domestic lawyers and law firms used. Nonetheless,
CEE clients honoured and accepted these international firms both as the
risk premium for acting on unstable and unpredictable markets, and as
consideration for superior quality of legal work.
With time, however, many skilled partners and associates established
their own legal firms and boutiques, providing clients with legal services of
international quality for a fraction of what international legal brands would
charge. As the business conditions in CEE became more stable, domestic
companies began to prefer these less expensive law firms with increasingly
established reputations over the big and expensive brand name firms. Even
if such small domestic law firms or boutiques do not have brand
recognition for international arbitration, or even the know-how to conduct
an international arbitration, they can provide cost-efficient, good-quality
advice, and representation before the domestic courts. The saturated legal
market prompted aggressive competition and low pricing. To explain the
scale of this problem, in CEE, a typical budget for a court representation in
a fairly complex commercial dispute by a well-regarded local law firm
could still be lower than the proposal a US or UK-based service provider
would make merely for management and storage of electronic files related
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to the same matter. Hence, cost efficiency is a highly pragmatic
consideration that should not be underestimated.
The next major problem with international arbitration in CEE is the lack
of trust the private sector has for non-state judicial business. This is
partially a legacy of the communist mentality and post-1989 abuses.
Businesses in this part of the world generally have little trust, and this
approach is even more acute with respect to institutions they ignore, and
cannot always be linked to ostensible forms of judicial authority, such as
court buildings, gowns, wigs, etc. Research conducted in 2005 in Southern
and Eastern Europe confirmed that ignorance and distrust were the two
most important factors limiting the use of arbitration by lawyers and parties
in some CEE states.39  A related problem is that, with respect to
international arbitrations in key institutions, CEE parties do not feel that
they own the process. T his is evidenced, for example, in the number of
appointments of CEE arbitrators in those disputes. The ratio of
appointments of CEE arbitrators is dramatically low and corresponds to
only a fraction of CEE cases handled by the arbitral institutions. This is to
a large extent the result of the scarcity of international arbitrators with
established reputations in CEE, and by the fact that much international
arbitration involving CEE are still handled by international law firms'
Paris, London or U.S. offices. This is changing and will need to change
even more in the future if CEE is to play larger role in the development of
international arbitration.
Another important feature of Central and Eastern Europe is the short
history of business organizations-the potential users of international
arbitration. Many companies opened only within the last twenty-five years
and are still run by their founders. This means that key decisions are still
taken by people with strong entrepreneurial spirit, who were most likely
brought up in a different environment when CEE was not as open to the
world as it is today. Those decision makers do not have the inclination to
look abroad to find solutions to their problems. The short track record of
these new companies also implies that they do not rely on procedures and
internal policies as much as Western organizations do, with a longer history
and more sophisticated internal corporate structures. This implies that it is
rather unlikely to fred a CEE-based company that would agree to
international arbitration in all of its commercial contracts because of its
internal policies against international arbitration. Rather, the analysis of
pros and cons will be done on a case-by-case basis, leading to sometimes
chaotic results.
The conclusion is that future international commercial arbitration in CEE
39. Bruno Sch6nfelder, The Puzzling Underuse ofArbitration in Post-Communism
- A Law and Economics Analysis, FREIBERG WORKING PAPERS, no. 7, 2005, at 19.
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will have to respond to different needs than in the past, and it will have to
be managed differently. The model CEE arbitrating party is a risk-averse
and cost-sensitive client, who has achieved success on the domestic market
with relatively limited experience in international operations and
40international dispute settlement mechanisms. For such user, international
commercial arbitration could be a reasonable choice in three types of
matters.
The first type of matter that would benefit from international arbitration
is high-value agreements that are likely to provoke fact-intense and issue-
complex disputes on close technical questions. Construction,
infrastructure, and IT-related contracts are the typical representatives of
this matter. The same would also apply to financial disputes, including
M&A transactions, which may require commercially oriented approach and
financial expertise. In this respect, the key advantages of international
commercial arbitration-regardless of the geographic origin of the
parties-will include the possibility to appoint a knowledgeable tribunal,
provide party-appointed witness-expert reports and obtain documents from
the other party in the course of document production. Court litigation in
Europe, and in CEE in particular, does not and will not respond to these
needs in the foreseeable future because they are all civil law systems.
The second category includes matters in which arbitration may be
chosen in negotiations as a way to ensure a level playing field for the
parties. This would include the clich6 scenario of neither party being ready
to concede to the jurisdiction of the courts of the opposing party, and where
neither party has the bargaining strength allowing it to impose its will in
this respect on its opposing party. Such arbitration agreements are most
frequently leading to surprising and/or unwanted results. This is because
the deals over arbitration clauses in such situations are generally struck for
psychological and unmeritorious reasons, and are unsupported by any
previous transactional analysis that would refer to the most probable
adverse scenarios in the light of the applicable substantive and procedural
laws. These "midnight" clauses then lead to excessively costly and
redundant arbitrations over matters that should have been rather referred to
state courts, even in the opposing party's jurisdiction. On top of that,
incidental inclusion of arbitration clauses by non-trained parties often leads
to pathological arbitration clauses, generating even more costly, protracted,
and redundant disputes. Nonetheless, the limited lack of experience with
international dispute settlement, including limited trust in foreign judicial
40. See generally id. (providing an interesting insight into the possible reasons of
underuse of arbitration in South-Eastern Europe before 2005, suggesting legal
illiteracy coupled with a specific approach to business acquired during communism,
were the two main factors).
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systems on the part of many CEE businesses, is likely to be responsible for
midnight arbitration clauses to continue to be inserted into multiple
international contracts in the years to come.
The third category of matters includes transactions between CEE parties
and their business partners from states that are perceived as representing an
increased political, legal or commercial risk. In recent years, many CEE-
based entities have been expanding into new markets, including the African
and Asian markets, still largely unknown to them and which present
increased risks. In this new reality, CEE companies entering international
markets will need international arbitration to protect their commercial
interest in the same manner as the Western European and the U.S.
companies sought to protect their CEE interests after 1990. As a part of
this wider trend, there seems to be an ever more visible division between
the states that joined the European Union in 2004 and those CEE countries
that have not joined the EU to date. The distinction manifests itself
primarily in the appearance of a number of investment treaty arbitrations,
such as Czech entities as claimants against Southern European states. Such
cases are a recent phenomenon and are indicative of the increased legal,
political, and commercial risk of doing business in the southern part of
Central Europe. The same risk, although with lower visibility, is also
present on the commercial side of arbitration.
CONCLUSION
What will be the position of international commercial arbitration in CEE
in ten years from now? This question may be difficult to answer, as it
cannot be taken for granted that arbitration will generally have the same
status as it has now. The changes permeating within both the economy and
human behaviour may demand that arbitration evolve into a cheaper, faster,
and more standardized procedure. With t is caveat, it is reasonable to
assume that CEE parties will follow the prevailing worldwide trend.
Based on the changing landscape, experts can predict two regional
trends. First, CEE states' involvement in international arbitrations is likely
to decrease. This will involve investment treaty arbitration, as the
European Commission is likely to intensify its efforts to cause the Member
States of the European Union to terminate the intra-EU bilateral
investment treaties. Within 20 years this should lead to a radical decrease
in the number of bilateral investment reaty arbitrations involving the CEE
countries. Additionally, states' involvement in significant arbitrations from
infrastructure disputes is also expected to drop.
The second trend should involve an increasingly more sophisticated use
of international arbitration by CEE entities in an international context. This
will be a consequence of the increasing presence of such entities on
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international markets and, inevitably, before various dispute resolution
fora. However, loyalty to international arbitral institutions is not to be
expected too soon, if ever. Rather, the selection of an arbitration clause is
likely to be preceded with a detailed SWOT analysis in each individual
case, as a result of which arbitration may be chosen for those disputes,
where it can most clearly show its advantages over other forms of dispute
resolution.
